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Abraham Lincoln and Unionism in East Tennessee 
 
 Often, the American Civil War finds itself painted in classrooms across the 
country as a conflict of clear-cut ideologies in the North and South. The citizens of the 
northern states wished to preserve the sacred Union, and northern forces fought 
valiantly while invading a rebellious South. The Unionists of eastern Tennessee put to 
rest the false generalization that all southerners were loyal to the Confederate States of 
America, as their struggle throughout the war on the behalf of the Union was a long and 
bloody event. On June 8, 1861, Tennessee voted to secede from the United States. The 
vote was far from unanimous, as 66 percent of the eligible voters of east Tennessee 
showed their northern tastes by voting to remain in the Union. Much to the dismay of 
these loyal Unionists, eastern Tennessee was soon brought under the control of the 
Confederacy. It was not until 1863 that a federal army entered eastern Tennessee, a full 
two years after the June of 1861 declaration of secession.1 President Abraham Lincoln 
heard the cry of the eastern Tennessean Unionists even prior to the state’s secession; the 
delay of liberation for the East was not from a lack of sympathies from the President. 
Lincoln wished to intervene quickly on the behalf of eastern Tennessee for both the 
protection of loyalists and the capture of a strategically important area, but an invading 
Union army was held back by non-cooperating Union generals. Indeed, pro-Union 
forces in east Tennessee created a situation that the Confederate government was 
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unfamiliar with. Where most of the war was fought between North and South, the 
violence in east Tennessee was between neighbors. This violence was unlike anything 
else seen in the war, as the relative geographic isolation of east Tennessee led to a civil 
war inside the Civil War. The guerrilla warfare and subsequent bloody crackdown of 
Unionists created a difficult and unusual situation for the governments of both sides of 
the conflict to tackle. 
 East Tennessee differed from the rest of Tennessee in many ways. The 
Cumberland Plateau separated the East from the West, forming a geological barrier that 
created a sense of independence for the eastern Tennesseans. Where the Democrats 
held influence in the middle and western parts of the state, the Whigs held political 
power in the East. Eastern Tennesseans also held far less agricultural prowess as the two 
other regions of the state did, which worked to further separate the cultures of the state. 
The easterners held their own railroad system that ran from the North to the South. The 
railroad failed to run East to West, where it would have connected all three regions of 
the state. Slavery played perhaps the largest role in a separate eastern culture as slaves 
contributed to only 9.2 percent of east Tennessee’s population, compared to the rest of 
the state whose population hovered around one-third enslaved.2  
The East showed their independence as tension began to mount in Tennessee, 
even prior to the June 8, 1861 secession referendum. Leading Unionists united at the 
Knoxville Convention to declare the illegality of secession, and also proposed the 
possibility of creating their own state loyal to the Union.3 When Tennessee broke from 
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the United States, prominent Unionists from the East quickly showed the effects of their 
distinct culture. Andrew Johnson remained in his seat in the Senate. Knoxville printers 
such as William G. Brownlow continued to push out pro-Union rhetoric, and 
congressman Thomas A.R. Nelson used his pre-war popularity to rally easterners for the 
Union.4 Nelson in his speeches, according to the Cincinnati Commercial Tribune, spoke 
of “his unalterable attachment to the Union, denied the right of Secession, and 
repudiated the slavery agitation of the North.”5 The Boston Daily Advertiser described 
the eastern Tennesseans as “resolute anti-secessionists” who displayed “unconditional 
Unionism.”6 Elections soon ran in Tennessee, and in several eastern districts pro-Union 
congressmen were elected. These congressmen, in an act of defiance to their 
Confederate oppressors, attempted to journey to Washington to join the United States 
Senate, instead of its Confederate counterpart.7 
 President Lincoln knew of the forthcoming difficulties the Unionists faced even 
prior to Tennessean secession. On May 14, 1861, Lincoln received a letter from former 
Tennessee legislator John B. Rodgers that cited that Union men were now subject to 
persecution if they spoke out against the Confederacy. Rodgers described the east 
Tennessean’s situation as a “deplorable one… The Union men are now threatened with 
personal violence.”8 The Unionists steadfast support of the Union did indeed provoke 
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the loathing of their neighbors. As the election for governor rolled around in the state in 
late 1862, eastern Tennesseans once again showed their Unionist flavors by voting for 
the anti-secession candidate. This, coupled with the fact that the previously elected 
Unionists representatives for Congressional seats had made it to the United States of 
America Congress, showed Confederate leadership that the East was not to be trusted in 
governing itself. The acting governor of the state begged CSA president, Jefferson Davis, 
for troops to keep the eastern half of the state in order. For the Confederacy, control of 
eastern Tennessee was vital to the war effort. The idea of rebellion inside southern land 
frightened Confederate leaders. Far from being only a nuisance that would require 
troops diverted from the war front, the strategic and economic importance of the east 
portion of the state could not be understated. The eastern half of the state was an 
important producer of cattle, hogs, flour, and salt that would go to a rebel force that 
needed all the provisions it could muster.9 The Confederates also desperately needed 
control of the railroad that ran through east Tennessee. The railroad connected the 
capital of the Confederacy, Richmond, to the rest of the entire South. Union control of 
the east portion of the state, or even acts of sabotage by Unionists inside of the state 
would spell disaster for Southern railway supply lines. The “Keystone of the Southern 
Arch” was a popular title for eastern Tennessee, a title well deserved. 10 
The 14,000 troops that Jefferson Davis sent at the request of the governor did 
little to prevent Unionists in eastern Tennessee from speaking out against the 
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Confederacy. In the fall of 1861, a native son of Tennessee, Confederate brigadier 
general Felix K. Zollicoffer, was given military oversight of east Tennessee. Zollicoffer 
attempted to pursue a policy of leniency with the loyal Unionists, in hope that if the 
Confederacy kept out of their affairs, the Unionists would comply with a non-violent 
Confederate occupation. The hope was that eastern Tennesseans would be swayed to 
join the CSA, and Zollicoffer was tasked with the difficult job of convincing Unionists to 
abandon the Union. The conversion of the Unionists to the Confederate failed, as even 
with Zollicoffer’s urgings, easterners continued to voice their support of the Union 
cause. William G. Brownlow’s Knoxville Whig was a prominent catalyst for Union 
dissent. Brownlow continued to urge open acts of defiance against Confederate control, 
and informed his reader to prepare for war within the region. In one issue of the Whig 
he urged “all man, women, and child” to prepare for, “a great battle against the 
Confederate scourge.” In another he labeled all secessionists as, “the negro-worshiping 
aristocracy [and] the cotton and tobacco-planting lord.” Brownlow’s criticism of the 
Confederacy led to his arrest on December 6, 1861 as Confederate forces began a 
crackdown on pro-Union publications.11 The Confederacy tightened its grip on the 
eastern part of the state, censoring the press and preventing the meeting of small 
groups, other than those out in the open in full support of the Confederacy.  
 Lincoln stood strong in his urgency for liberating the Unionists as military 
leaders in the West put their focuses elsewhere. The East’s strategic significance did not 
escape the President or others in the northern government. The possibility of cutting off 
the southern supply line and gaining control of the railroad would go a long way to 
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halting southern operations. It would also be vital to cutting off the capital of Richmond 
from the rest of the South, allowing Union forces a better chance to capture the capital. 
The President also promoted eastern Tennessee’s strategic significance to the North, as 
gaining control of the East would mean control of its crops and livestock, as well as the 
railways needed to supply troops with these provisions as the Union armies marched 
through the South. In fact, the recapture of eastern Tennessee became somewhat of a 
pet project for Lincoln.12 The President was motivated by his military and economic 
reasons, yet he also possessed a desire to end the suffering of the loyalists in east 
Tennessee. Freeing these loyalists from southern control would also mean the possibility 
of more Union reinforcements from eastern Tennessee.  
 It was in the fall of 1861 that Lincoln’s wishes came to fruition, as William B. 
Carter of Tennessee proposed a plan to cut off the railroad supply lines that Lincoln so 
wished to see severed. The plan would see eastern Unionists rebel in full force and burn 
nine railroad bridges running through Tennessee. At the same time, the forces under 
General Don Carlos Buell would invade from the North. The sabotage of the bridges 
would deal a massive blow to the Confederacy, as the railroad from Richmond to 
Atlanta, Charlotte, and New Orleans would not be able to make up for the strength in 
transport that the eastern Tennessean line held. Carter presented the plan to Lincoln in 
September of the year, and the President happily obliged to approve the process. In 
November, a small group of Unionists men moved on their targets and attacked the 
railroad bridges. The Unionists were successful in burning five of the eight bridges, but 
were taken by surprise by Confederate forces at the other three. Buell failed to lead his 
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forces in a subsequent attack, and the Confederates were able to maintain control of the 
railway lines. This event triggered all-out violence in eastern Tennessee. Union men 
moved to continue their rebellion, and Confederates moved quickly to suppress any 
more outbreaks of pro-Union attacks.  
Don Carlos Buell’s failure to coincide his attack with the burning of the railway 
bridges came from his own self-interest and desire for power, feelings which put 
Lincoln’s plans of freeing the Unionists in Tennessee on hold. After Lincoln expressed 
his desires to Buell of freeing east Tennessee, Buell proceeded to wait in Kentucky for 
months with his troops. When General Don Carlos Buell was given command of the 
invasion of Tennessee, he was given firm suggestions by both Lincoln and General-in-
Chief George McClellan to ensure that Buell liberated the struggling Unionists first. 
Lincoln desired to send Buell’s army from their encampment in Kentucky, over the 
border, and into eastern Tennessee, freeing the Unionists under siege.13 In writing, 
Lincoln argued to Buell that the President would prefer “a point on the railroad south of 
the Cumberland Gap than to take Nashville, which is not situated on a major east-west 
railroad.”14 More importantly, Lincoln argued for the freeing of his Unionist friends in 
eastern Tennessee: “My distress is that our friends are being hanged and driven to 
despair, and even now I fear are thinking of taking rebel arms for the sake of personal 
protection. In this we lose the most valuable stake we have in the South.” However, it 
was the lack of authority that Lincoln commanded over Buell that doomed the prospects 
of securing eastern Tennessee quickly, as Lincoln had no official sway over the self-
 
13 Stephen E. Ambrose. “The Union Command System and the Donelson Campaign.” Military 
Affairs 24, no. 2 (1960): 80-82 
14 James L. McDonough. "Tennessee and the Civil War." Tennessee Historical Quarterly 54, no. 3 
(1995): 193. 
 8 
interested Buell. Buell’s inaction and dodging letters frustrated the President. Lincoln 
would write to Buell on January 6, 1862 that, “Your dispatch of yesterday had been 
received, and it disappoints and distresses me.” Although Unionist relief lay just a 
hundred miles north, Lincoln could do little to exert his will on the glory-seeking Buell, 
who believed that an attack on the Confederate capital of Nashville would cement his 
name in greatness much more than the freeing of the Unionists in Tennessee. So, Buell 
instead lay in wait in the relative safety of Kentucky, plotting his attack on Nashville 
while Unionists were murdered and tortured in east Tennessee.  
Following the Unionist attack on railroad bridges on the vital eastern railway line, 
Confederate forces began occupying east Tennessee as though it were truly a rebellious 
state inside a larger country. Confederate official began panicking as reports of 
hundreds of Union men gathering in armed militias were reported around the country 
side. The Confederates were convinced that a full Union revolt was happening in the 
eastern half of Tennessee, and would do anything to root out the rebellion. Threats were 
made to Union men, such as one ad in the Memphis Appeal asking to purchase 
thorough-bred bloodhounds, whose sole purpose were to “chase the infernal, cowardly 
Lincoln bushwhackers of east Tennessee… (who have taken advantage of the bush to kill 
and cripple many good soldiers,) to their haunts and capture them.”15 The bodies of the 
suspected Union conspirators of the attack on the railroad bridges hung from tree 
branches near the tracks, allowing for passengers to hit them with sticks as they rode 
past. The city of Knoxville was place under martial law, and the rights of citizens to their 
own personal weapons were taken away. The Confederates also began tracking rebelling 
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Unionists with not only bloodhounds, but Indians as well. Other Unionists were simply 
torn from their homes, beaten severely, and left for dead. On some occasions, a whole 
neighborhood would be arrested for their suspected allegiance to the Union. Overall, 
between 2,000 and 3,000 Union civilians were murdered in east Tennessee due to their 
loyalty to the Union and disdain for the Confederacy.16 This purge of Union 
sympathizers reached its height in the weeks and months following the burning of the 
railway bridges, as Confederate forces worked to scare potential Unionists away from 
attempting any more acts of rebellion.  
While conditions in east Tennessee worsened due to the aforementioned 
persecution, Lincoln continued to hear the pleas for action by Unionists. Representative 
William B. Carter wrote to Lincoln asking for “20,000 men, 20,000 stand of arms, and a 
competent commander,” while also relaying to Lincoln that he hoped not to have to 
return to his people “but with little hope that the Government which owes us protection 
will save us from the terrible evils which we are threatened.”17 Benjamin A. Prentiss, a 
Brigadier General in Illinois, even wrote to Lincoln on the influx of Tennessean refugees, 
along with Prentiss’s desire to stage an attack focused on liberating Tennessee.18 Lincoln 
sympathized with men such as Carter and Prentiss, and wished to provide aid quickly to 
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the loyal Americans. Even as the Unionists waited for federal help that never came, the 
loyalists of Tennessee worked to undermine CSA control by forming bushwhacking 
units that used guerrilla warfare to harass Confederate forces. These units struck CSA 
supply lines and troops, striking fear into Confederate soldiers, while also prompting 
even greater persecution of Union citizens by Confederate forces. Wives and family 
members of suspected Union men were tortured by southern forces in response to 
suspicion of involvement with guerrilla groups. All out local warfare soon spread 
throughout east Tennessee was both Union and Confederate marauders began wreaking 
havoc on the countryside.  
 Eastern Tennessee proved to be unlike any other part of the South in the Civil 
War. Its northern culture fostered Union values, and in turn created a rebellious state 
inside a rebellious Confederacy. However, the Unionists of Tennessee faced persecution 
like no other citizens in the Civil War. They were arrested, beaten, and murdered, yet 
remained loyal to the United States of America. The Unionists fought their own guerrilla 
war, never giving up on the cause of the Union. Indeed, the east Tennesseans worked to 
undermine the CSA, even while they saw little support from the federal government. 
President Lincoln felt the suffering of the Unionists, and did all in his power to influence 
the Union forces to move into Eastern Tennessee and free the Unionists from their 
oppression. Lincoln and his associates in the northern government also saw the great 
strategic, economic, military value of East Tennessee. Yet, it was the failure of the Union 
command and the seeking of personal glory by military officers such as Don Carlos Buell 
that doomed the Unionists to two years of occupation. The East bled as Buell decided 
that it would be better to conquer an enemy capital than save his own people. Abraham 
Lincoln remained helpless to protect the very citizens that he swore he would protect, 
 11 
and helpless to secure the railroad line that would help cut off Richmond from the rest 
of the South. Andrew Johnson would return to his state as military governor in 1863, 
and effectively recaptured Knoxville and Chattanooga, which gave the Unionists hope 
that their state was free of Confederate control for good.19 Johnson’s arrival marked the 
beginning of the end of the suffering of the east Tennessee Unionists: a suffering that 
Buell helped cause on his search for glory, while President Lincoln powerlessly looked 
on.  
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